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I.

INTRODUCTION

I
W
I

n any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 1 For example, it is prohibited to
employ weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or
weapons that are inherently indiscriminate, including weapons that cannot be
aimed or whose effects cannot be controlled. 2 Few would deny that these are
fundamental tenets of the law of armed conflict. 3 To support these basic rules,
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I requires legal reviews of all new weapons,
means and methods of warfare. 4
The existence and scope of this obligation received considerable attention at recent meetings of the States party to the United Nations Certain
Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW). The CCW meetings devoted
significant time and resources to examining Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS) and whether there should be a sixth protocol to the Convention preemptively banning such systems, as advocated by some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 5 and fourteen States. 6 Other States, includ-

1. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
arts. 35(1)–(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
2. AP I, supra note 1, arts. 35(2), 51(4)(b)–(c).
3. See 2 CUSTOMARY I NTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1505–82 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); see also W ILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, W EAPONS
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 46–73 (2d ed. 2016).
4. AP I, supra note 1, art. 36; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, LAW OF W AR MANUAL § 6.2 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, LAW OF W AR MANUAL].
5. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS (2012).
6. Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow, CAMPAIGN TO STOP K ILLER ROBOTS (Apr. 15,
2016), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/ (noting that the following
countries have publically endorsed a ban: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, State of Palestine and Zimbabwe).
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ing the United Kingdom and the United States, publically declared that existing law is sufficient to regulate LAWS. 7 Indeed, the existing legal obligation to review new weapon systems before they are fielded is a key component of both U.S. and UK policy.
The merits of a ban on autonomous weapons have been well examined
in academic law journals, including these pages. 8 Very often, the LAWS debate is stymied by disagreement on what exactly is meant by “autonomous.”
While this definitional issue is important, especially in the CCW discussions,
it can often detract from the substantive issues that should drive this debate.
As a result, the UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC),
itself responsible for Article 36 reviews on behalf of the UK government,
invited the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S.
Naval War College to partner with it to deliver a Forum in October 2016
addressing how lawyers charged with Article 36 reviews might approach
their responsibilities in the context of highly automated or autonomous technologies. This “Second International Weapon Review Forum” (the Forum)
was attended by a broad mix of State representatives, including weapon reviewing lawyers, academics from science and the law, interested NGOs and
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 9 It was conducted
under the Chatham House Rule.
This article examines the key issues discussed in the Forum, specifically
those issues that are likely to arise in the context of legal reviews of autonomous and highly automated weapon systems. It concludes that properly applied, Article 36 is an effective gatekeeper that can and should prevent systems that are incapable of complying with the law from reaching the battle-

7. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Statement to the
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Possible Challenges to IHL Due to Increasing Degrees of Autonomy (Apr. 11–15, 2016), https://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/37B0481990BC31DAC1257F940053D2AE
/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_ChallengestoIHL_Statements_United+Kingdom.pdf (“The
UK’s clear position is that IHL is the applicable legal framework for the assessment and
use of all weapons systems in armed conflict.”).
8. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY J OURNAL
231, 233 (2013).
9. State representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States attended. NGOs Article 36 and the Stockholm International Peace Research I nstitute (SIPRI) also attended.
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field (whether autonomous or otherwise). The application of weapon reviews mitigates against a requirement for a preemptive ban. That said, there
is a legitimate concern that many States do not take seriously their legal obligation to review new weapons. Further, some States have openly doubted
the value of Article 36 reviews in their public positions. 10 Focus on the Article 36 obligation in the LAWS debates at CCW may help change this situation. International fora addressing the conduct of Article 36 reviews also assist States to share best practices and lessons learned, adding strength to a
key component of the law of armed conflict.
To consider these issues, this article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses
anticipated technologies already in development, which might fall within the
gravamen of NGOs’ objections to LAWS. Part III assesses the aspects of
weapon reviews most pertinent to LAWS, while Part IV examines whether
there are, or needs to be, developing norms governing the use of autonomy
in weapon systems. Part V concludes.
II.

THE FACTS

A. Capability Gaps
Militaries develop weapon systems to fill capability gaps. 11 To better understand issues related to testing and reviewing autonomous technologies, it is
important to consider which capability gaps LAWS might fill. This consideration provides a useful context when assessing current and near-future
weapon systems. Capability gaps can be identified by examining national defense policy documents or by analyzing current and near-future weapon systems. This Part will do each in turn.
DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends Fifth Edition – Out to 2045, while not declarative of UK policy, predicts an increased
role for automation and robotics across the field of human activity, including

10. For example, at the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, China and Brazil observed that Article 36 reviews might lack efficacy
because reviews are unilateral and lack transparency.
11. See, e.g., MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: HOW DO D ACQUIRES W EAPON SYSTEMS AND RECENT E FFORTS TO REFORM THE PROCESS 4 (2014) (describing the U.S. weapons acquisitions process in which
capability gaps are identified and addressed through the acquisitions process).
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defense and warfare. 12 This finding is echoed more starkly in the accompanying Future Operating Environment 2035 (FOE 35), which predicts that many
western military capabilities risk being overmatched by technological advancement in the next twenty years, and notes that the proliferation of automation and artificial intelligence is likely to be key to this development. FOE
35 also suggests that some western States initially will be reluctant to rely on
these technologies because in the nascent stages of development there may
be ethical or reliability concerns. 13 Societal trust and confidence in future
defense technology were key themes at the Forum, and this article discusses
these issues in Part IV.
The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) expresses the
defense policy of the sitting government. The 2015 Review highlights the
dangers associated with “long-term shifts in the balance of global economic
and military power, increasing competition among states, and the emergence
of more powerful non-state actors.”14 It also notes the increasing importance
of technology in this shift.
The U.S. counterpart document to the SDSR is the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), which echoes many of the same security concerns. The 2014
QDR begins with an acknowledgment that “modern warfare is evolving rapidly” and will lead “to increasingly contested battlespace in the air, sea, [cyberspace] and space domains.”15 Like the SDSR, the QDR notes that future
conflicts will likely span the spectrum from “hybrid contingencies against
proxy groups” to “high-end conflict against a state power.”16 The QDR also
acknowledges that many future adversaries will be technologically sophisticated, which will require the Department of Defense to “sustain priority investments in science, technology, research, and development both within the
12. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STRATEGIC TRENDS PROGRAMME: GLOBAL STRATEGIC TRENDS – OUT TO 2045 67–73 (5th ed. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/20140821
_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf.
13. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STRATEGIC TRENDS PROGRAMME: FUTURE OPERATING E NVIRONMENT 2035 13–20 (1st ed. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484861/20151203-DCDC_FOE_35.pdf.
14. UNITED KINGDOM, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE
AND SECURITY REVIEW 2015: A SECURE AND PROSPEROUS UNITED K INGDOM 15 (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf.
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2014 § III
(2014).
16. Id., § VII.
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defense sector and beyond.”17 Regarding autonomy, the QDR specifically
notes that “[a]utomated and autonomous systems as well as robotics already
have a wide range of commercial, industrial, and military applications—a
trend that will likely continue.”18
There is general agreement in these documents. Both the United Kingdom and the United States are concerned with threats from both non-State
actors and States. Likewise, both countries seem acutely aware of the enhanced threat posed by adversaries using advanced technology and asymmetric warfare strategies and both governments have more specifically addressed the importance of autonomy in other policy documents. Nonetheless, as regards LAWS, the two States have declared differing policy positions.
In 2012, the United States published Department of Defense Directive
3000.09.19 This document provides the most comprehensive policy treatment by any State on the issue of autonomy and war. The directive assigns
responsibilities within the Department of Defense for the development of
autonomous weapons, provides definitions, establishes the requirement for
“appropriate levels of human judgment” over autonomous weapons and creates an acquisition and testing model for autonomous weapons. 20 Of particular note to this article, the directive requires autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons to “go through rigorous hardware and software verification
and validation (V&V) and realistic system developmental and operational
test and evaluation (T&E).”21 The directive further requires retesting every
time changes are made to the system. Enclosure 3 to the directive specifically
addresses the process for conducting legal reviews for autonomous weapons.
Notably, the directive requires a legal review before the weapon enters the
development process as well as when the system is fielded. 22
While the two countries’ assessments of the future threat are practically
identical, the United Kingdom has developed a different policy position on
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also U.S. ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY ROBOTIC AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM
STRATEGY 1 (2017) (“Pursuing [Robotic Autonomous Systems] allows the Army to improve combat effectiveness of the future eforce.”).
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [hereinafter Directive 3000.09] (incorporating
Change 1, May 8, 2017).
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 7.
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the use of autonomy. In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom
has indicated on several occasions that it is not developing weapons that
would be classified as LAWS and that it has no intention to do so. The
United Kingdom has also consistently said that weapons will always remain
under human control. 23
The foregoing discussion provides a snapshot of the future operating
environment and asks how these assessments might lead to the development
of weapon systems with autonomous or highly automated features. Before
considering future systems, consider briefly the state of current systems with
autonomous features. Globally, the most widely fielded examples are shipborne Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS), such as the U.S. Mk15 Phalanx,
Dutch Goalkeeper, Russian AK-630 series and the Italian Dardo. In certain
modes, set and operated by a human operator, these systems can select and
engage incoming targets such as an anti-ship missile without further human
intervention. Collectively, forty-five countries have fielded more than 2,000
CIWS systems. 24 Many countries have also fielded similar land-based systems
such as the U.S. Patriot air defense system25 or the Russian Antey S-300VM
system. 26
It is at this point that the LAWS debate can descend into one of definitions rather than substance. Under some approaches, these are not strictly
23. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Statement to the
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, General Exchange ¶ 3 (Apr. 11–15, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http Assets)/49456EB7B5AC3769C1257F920057D1FE/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_Gen eralExchange_Statements_United+Kingdom.pdf (“Furthermore, we have no intention of
ever developing systems that could operate without any human control. The UK is committed to ensuring its weapons remain under human control.”).
24. Seventy Goalkeeper systems have been fielded by nine countries. See J ANE’S,
W EAPONS: NAVAL, Goalkeeper (Jan. 3, 2017), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1499735. Nine-hundred Phalanx systems have been fielded by twenty-three countries. See J ANE’S, W EAPONS: NAVAL, Mk15 Close-in Weapons System, Phalanx (June 5, 2017),
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jnws0269-jnw_. Fifty-two Dardo systems have been
fielded by nine countries. See J ANE’S, C4ISR & MISSION SYSTEMS: MARITIME, Dardo/NA30/NA-25, (May 12, 2017), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1505001. Finally, more
than 1,150 AK-series systems have been fielded by twenty-four countries. See J ANE’S,
W EAPONS: NAVAL, 30 mm AK-630/AK-630M/AK-306/AK-630M-2 (Duet) (July 27, 2017),
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1495990.
25. J ANE’S, LAND W ARFARE PLATFORMS: ARTILLERY & AIR DEFENSE, MIM-104 Patriot (Oct. 17, 2016), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1501650.
26. J ANE’S, LAND W ARFARE PLATFORMS: ARTILLERY & AIR DEFENSE, S-300V (Dec.
28, 2016), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1501620.
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“autonomous” systems at all. For example, the United Kingdom defines autonomy more narrowly than Directive 3000.09 does. The United Kingdom’s
approach to defining autonomy stems from another DCDC publication,
Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/11, which actually concerns unmanned aerial
systems. The JDN offers the following definition: “An autonomous system
is capable of understanding higher level intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able to
take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action . . . .”27 In contrast, Directive 3000.09 defines an autonomous weapon system as “[a] weapon system that, once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”28
The United Kingdom would not therefore consider these systems as
truly “autonomous.” Similarly, the LAWS agenda at CCW focuses on emerging and future, not existing, technologies, indicating no appetite to bring
these sorts of systems within any definition of LAWS. Nonetheless, to avoid
the definitions issue, important though it is in other contexts, this article
adopts a low definitional threshold for “autonomy,” and approaches these
systems as “first-wave” autonomous weapons. Using this definitional approach, one may consider “second-wave” systems to include recently fielded
systems such as the Israeli Harpy counter-radar system29 and the British
Brimstone anti-tank missile. 30 Like the first-wave weapons, second-wave
weapons are designed to target objectives that are military by nature. Unlike
first-wave systems, second-wave systems are not point defense systems that
are fixed in a single location and designed to protect a particular object. Second-wave systems are exemplified by the spate of unmanned combat aerial
vehicles currently under development such as the Dassault Neuron, 31 BAE

27. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, J OINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 2-3 (2011).
28. Directive 3000.09, supra note 19, at 13.
29. J ANE’S, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND TARGETS, IAI Harpy (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1317898.
30. J ANE’S, AIR-LAUNCHED W EAPONS, Brimstone (Legacy) Apr. 28, 2016), https://janes
.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1307308.
31. DASSAULT AVIATION: I NTRODUCTION, http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/
defense/neuron/introduction/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
396

Autonomous Weapons and Weapon Reviews

Vol. 93

Systems Taranis32 and the Northrop Grumman X-47. 33 These systems all
have autonomous navigation capabilities and could be configured to carry
armed payloads. Similar developments can be seen in rotary-wing systems
such as the autonomous Blackhawk helicopter,34 Lockheed Martin K-Max35
and Northrop Grumman Fire Scout. 36
Several ground-based next generation systems are currently in development including the Guardium class of ground vehicles, which can autonomously patrol an area 37 or navigate to a given location. 38 The Guardium vehicles have been in service with the Israeli Defense Force since 2012, 39 and
have recently been replaced with the Segev vehicles, which are automated to
an even greater degree. 40 In 2011, Lockheed Martin began operationally field
testing a similar system dubbed the Squad Mission Support System (SMSS),
which is designed to “follow the leader” autonomously. 41 These developments keep with the U.S. Army Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS)
strategy, which presents five objectives for RAS: increasing situational awareness, lightening the soldier’s physical and cognitive workloads, sustaining the

32. BAE SYSTEMS, PRODUCTS: TARANIS, http://www.baesystems.com/en/product/taranis (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
33. NORTHROP GRUMMAN, X-47B UCAS: UNMANNED COMBAT AIR SYSTEM (2015),
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/UCASD_Data_Sheet.pdf.
34. Thierry Dubois, Sikorsky to Add Black Hawk to Autonomy Program, AINONLINE
(June 11, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-0611/sikorsky-add-black-hawk-autonomy-program.
35. LOCKHEED MARTIN, K-MAX, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/
kmax.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
36. NORTHROP GRUMMAN, CAPABILITIES: FIRE SCOUT, http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/FireScout/Pages/default.aspx?utm_source=PrintAd&utm_medium=Redirect&utm_campaign=FireScout+Redirect (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
37. J ANE’S, LAND W ARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guardium Mk III (May 18, 2016), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1706382.
38. J ANE’S, LAND W ARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guardium Mk II (May 18, 2016), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1495489.
39. J ANE’S, LAND W ARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guardium Mk III, supra note 37.
40. Yaakov Lappin, Israel’s New Segev UGVs to Become “Fully Autonomous,” J ANE’S 360
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.janes.com/article/65900/israel-s-new-segev-ugvs-to-beco m efully-autonomous.
41. LOCKHEED MARTIN, SMSS (SQUAD MISSION SUPPORT SYSTEM), http://www.
lockheedmartin.com/us/products/sm ss.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
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force with increased efficiency, facilitating movement and maneuver and
protecting the force. 42
Water-based autonomous systems evidence similar developments. The
U.S. Department of the Navy sees autonomy as a core technology to their
future success. 43 There are, for example, numerous autonomous countermine vehicles under development, including the SeaFox/SeaWolf, 44
SeaOtter, 45 Knifefish, 46 REMUS47 and Pluto Gigas. 48 Other sea-based technologies include autonomous systems delivered by airborne or seabed delivery systems. 49
The “third-wave” of autonomy-enabled weapon systems will be characterized by increased autonomy and, most critically, artificial intelligence enabled systems. In the 2013 Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the U.S. Department of Defense summarizes the transition:
The future of autonomous systems is characterized as a movement beyond
autonomous mission execution to autonomous mission performance. The
difference between execution and performance is that the former simply
executes a preprogrammed plan whereas performance is associated with
42. U.S. ARMY, supra note 18, at 1–2.
43. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT: HOW AUTONOMY CAN
TRANSFORM NAVAL OPERATIONS 9 (2012), https://www.nrac.navy.mil/docs/NRAC_Final_Report-Autonomy_NOV2012.pdf (“The addition of autonomous systems may be the
only solution for addressing the evolving strategic A2AD challenge to the Fleet.”); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE NAVY UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE (UUV) MASTERPLAN 57 (2004), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf [hereinafter
THE NAVY UUV MASTERPLAN] (“Autonomy issues are key to all the UUV [underwater
unmanned vehicles] missions.”).
44. Willi Hornfeld, SeaFox IQ/SeaWolf: New Mini and Midi AUVs for Security and Inspection, http://auvac.org/uploads/configuration_spec_sheets/Hornfeld -SeaFox%20IQS eaWolf. pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
45. ATLAS MARIDAN SEAOTTER: AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLE (AUV),
http://auvac.org/uploads/configuration_spec_sheets/Atlas%20sea%20otter.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
46. GENERAL DYNAMICS MISSION SYSTEMS, KNIFEFISH UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE, https://gdmissionsystems.com/maritime-strategic/submarine-systems/knifefishunmanned-undersea-vehicle/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
47. J ANE’S, UNMANNED MARITIME VEHICLES AND SYSTEMS, Remus 100 (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/juws2192-jumv.
48. IDROBO TICA, PLUTO GIGAS, http://www.idrobotica.com/pluto-gigas.php (last
visited Aug. 21, 2017).
49. THE NAVY UUV MASTERPLAN, supra note 43, at 63.
398

Autonomous Weapons and Weapon Reviews

Vol. 93

mission outcomes that can vary even during a mission and require deviation from preprogrammed tasks.50

B. The Technology of Autonomy
Artificial intelligence is fundamental to achieving higher levels of autonomy.
Given the likely centrality of artificial intelligence in future warfare, it is
worthwhile to consider the technology. Within the broader field of artificial
intelligence, deep learning systems such as convolutional neural networks are
perhaps the most relevant to near-future military capability development. As
discussed below, a neural network differs from a traditional computer system
in that it is comprised of millions of nodes arrayed in layers. 51 This allows for
vastly increased processing powers in certain applications. 52 To use but one
example, Google recently converted Google Translate to use a convolutional
neural network. Instantly, the translation service reduced translation errors
by an average of 60%. 53 The technology of neural networks is discussed below, but it is not hyperbole to suggest that potential military applications are
virtually unlimited. Examples include systems that could identify enemy personnel, incredibly precise weapon systems, systems that could predict hostile
actions, robots that could navigate complex terrain and systems that could
map out enemy networks. Given the likely centrality of artificial intelligence
in future warfare, it is worthwhile to consider the technology.
The traditional approach to artificial intelligence, termed symbolic artificial intelligence, works on the premise that the system is provided data that
it then uses to make decisions. 54 For example, to enable a UAV to navigate
autonomously, engineers would program a UAV with maps together with a
large number of rules for flying (e.g., what altitude to fly, how to avoid other
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP
FY2013–2038 66–67 (2013), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DO
D-USRM-2013.pdf.
51. Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), http://
news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414.
52. Id.
53. Yonghui Wu et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap between
Human and Machine Translation, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, COMPUTER SCIENCE: COMPUTATION AND LANGUAGE (Oct. 8, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.08144v2.pdf.
54. See generally Vasant Honavar, Symbolic Artificial Intelligence and Numeric Artificial Neural
Networks: Towards a Resolution of the Dichotomy, in COMPUTATIONAL ARCHITECTURES INTEGRATING NEURAL AND SYMBOLIC PROCESSES: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF THE ART
351 (Ron Sun & Lawrence A. Bookman eds., 1995).
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aircraft, how to ensure sovereign airspace is not violated and what to do
when various contingencies are encountered). This approach works well in
systems where there are clear rules. 55 Where the rules are less clear or there
are many exceptions, this programing approach is less effective.
Artificial neural networks offer a second approach to artificial intelligence, which addresses the deficiencies in the symbolic approach by developing systems that learn based on data rather than rules. A neural network
learns by being provided data from which the system will generalize conclusions and develop rules. 56 The approach mimics the function of a human
brain. Where a human brain consists of neurons firing electrical charges to
one another, an artificial neural network utilizes nodes, arranged in layers,
which transfer information from one node to another. Thus, nodes in the
network receive either input information from the user (e.g., an image captured from a reconnaissance aircraft) or input from another node.
In a simplified example, imagine a neural network that is designed to
identify enemy tanks. The network will consist of multiple layers, with each
layer consisting of several nodes. 57 The first layer of nodes identifies the existence of individual pixels, while subsequent layers identify outlines of objects, motifs and parts. The final layer identifies the object. 58
For the network to function properly, the network must first be trained.
Training can be supervised or unsupervised. In a supervised training paradigm—the most common method of training—the system is provided both
input data and the desired outcome. In the example above, the system would
be provided an image of a tank and the desired output of “tank.” At the
beginning of the training, the system will not correctly identify the image as
a tank because the system has not yet learned what a tank is. The system

55. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, NEW Y ORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 2016,
(Magazine), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.h t
ml.
56. DAVID KRIESEL, A BRIEF I NTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS 7 (2007),
http://www.dkriesel.com/_media/science/neuronalenetze-en-zeta2-2col-dkrieselcom.
pdf.
57. Yann LeCun, Center for Data Science & Courant Institute, New York University
& Marc’Aurelio Ranzato, Google, International Machine Learning Conference, Deep
Learning Tutorial (June 16, 2013), http://www.cs.nyu.edu/~yann/talks/lecun-ranzatoicml2013.pdf.
58. Id.
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learns through a technique called backward propagation of errors (or backpropagation). 59 When the system provides an incorrect output—say, misidentifying a cat as a tank—an error value is assigned that reflects the divergence between the correct and incorrect answer. 60 The error value is then
backpropagated through the neural network, and the network then determines on its own how the various connections between nodes should be
weighed to correctly output “tank” when shown an image of a tank. In a
deep learning system, there may be hundreds of millions of nodes and
weighted values. The system will continue to self-adjust weighted values until
the desired result is met. This process is iterative and can take many hundreds
of thousands of iterations.
III.

LEGAL QUESTIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

All representatives at the Forum agreed that Article 36 of Additional Protocol I represented a binding obligation on States party to carry out a review
of new weapons, means and methods of warfare before their use during an
armed conflict. 61 Before turning to the substance of Article 36, it is worth
noting that the Forum discussed the problem of widespread non-observance
of the article. Most States party to Additional Protocol I do not complete
weapon reviews, or they do not publically acknowledge doing so. Some
States party are openly skeptical of the requirement. 62 Nonetheless, there has
been little protest from States that rigorously comply with Article 36 obligations. This quietude undoubtedly undermines the force and effectiveness of
Article 36. The authors are cautiously optimistic that the light the LAWS

59. Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, COMPUTER SCIENCE: NEURAL AND E VOLUTIONARY COMPUTING (Oct.
8, 2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7828.pdf.
60. See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, NATURE, May
28, 2015, at 436.
61. On these issues, see generally COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 J UNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 1471–74 (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
W AR MANUAL, supra note 4 (explaining the U.S. policy requirements for the legal review of
new weapons).
62. See generally Vincent Boulanin, Implementing Article 36 Weapon Reviews in the Light of
Increasing Autonomy in Weapon Systems, 2015/1 SIPRI I NSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY
(2015), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1501.pdf.
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debate has shone on Article 36 will prompt States to pay greater heed to the
obligation to carry out reviews.
As discussed above, Article 36 creates a binding obligation on States
party to Additional Protocol I to complete weapon reviews on new weapons
and new means and methods of warfare before use in an armed conflict.
Article 36 states:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international
law applicable to the High Contracting Party.63

Many aspects of Article 36’s language and drafting are of interest, but there
is not space in this article to assess the broader implications of, for example,
the use of the phrase “study development, acquisition or adoption,” or what
precisely falls within the scope of a “weapon, means or method of warfare.”64
Similarly, since all States represented at the Forum were either parties to the
Protocol or had, as a matter of policy, adopted their own weapon review
procedures, there was little need to examine whether there is any customary
law requirement to carry out weapon reviews. However, four aspects of the
conduct of reviews raise issues in the context of LAWS and will be addressed
in this Part. These aspects are (a) the requirement for “newness” and the
trigger for a weapon review; (b) the substantive questions required to be addressed during a review; (c) relevant factual considerations and (d) how testing and evaluation inform a review.
A. What is “New”?
Article 36 requires reviews of “new” weapons or means or methods of warfare. 65 This formulation is slightly different from that used by the United
States, which requires—as a matter of policy—“the legal review of the intended acquisition or procurement of weapons or weapon systems.”66 The
ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols seems to adopt a position
that emphasizes both the “new” criterion of the rule and the focus of the
63. AP I, supra note 1, art. 36.
64. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, at ¶ 1473.
65. AP I, supra note 1.
66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF W AR MANUAL, supra note 4, § 6.2.
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United States on the acquisition of the weapon. The Commentary states:
“The High Contracting Parties are obliged to determine the legality or illegality of the use of any new weapon introduced into their armed forces.” 67
Neither the commentary nor other ICRC publications discuss what constitutes “new” for Article 36.
The United Kingdom interprets “new” to refer both to weapons that are
new to the inventory and to existing weapons that have been modified or
whose nature or use has changed. 68 Most participants at the forum agreed
that Article 36 extends to both categories of “new” weapons. This raises the
question of how much change in the weapon’s inherent character or use is
required to trigger a new review. Such questions are particularly relevant to
artificial intelligence and deep learning systems, as discussed previously.
A precursor to Article 36, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, provides
useful insight on this issue, as the final clause of the Declaration states that
The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn
up in view of future improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity. 69

This language presupposes that technical “improvements” may be made to
weapons that would trigger the need to reconsider the legality of the weapon.
A weapon can be changed in one of two ways: changes to the way a weapon
is used, or changes to the weapon itself.
Consider first changes to the use of a weapon. Article 36 and the U.S.
Department of Defense regulation require that a review be undertaken based
on the normal intended use of the weapon. 70 Accordingly, weapon review
67. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, ¶ 1479.
68. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, UK W EAPON REVIEWS (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukweapon-reviews [hereinafter UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK W EAPON REVIEWS].
69. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1), 474.
70. International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977,
88 I NTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF W AR MANUAL, supra note 4, ¶ 6.2.2. (noting that the United States considers
the “weapon’s intended use” to determine whether the weapon is “calculated to cause superfluous injury”).
403

International Law Studies

2017

lawyers must review weapon systems with a view to the uses that their government intends to put them. 71 Presumably, where a weapon is to be used in
a way not envisioned by the review, this would trigger a new review. In the
United Kingdom, this normal use is described in a “Concept of Employment” or “Concept of Use,” which is submitted with the business case seeking financial approval for a system’s procurement. Where the normal use of
a weapon or weapon system changes during its operational lifetime, this is a
trigger for a new review. 72
Consider now changes to the weapon itself. This category of change is
especially pertinent in the context of weapon systems that employ machine
learning. By way of example, consider the Stinger missile, a portable antiaircraft system that uses an infrared sensor to home in on a target. 73 What if
the missile’s software were upgraded to a neural network that would allow
the missile to identify targets more accurately? Is this a new weapon that
would trigger a weapon review, or is this simply a software upgrade but the
same weapon system? What if the neural network is continuously learning?
Does the system at some point become a “new” system because it has
learned so much, or because it changes the manner in which it operates?
It seems self-evident that technical changes to an existing weapon could
have the effect of creating a new weapon. For example, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is a guidance package that is installed on unguided
bombs, thereby converting “dumb bombs” into satellite-guided “smart” munitions. 74 As with a neural network algorithm, a guidance package standing
alone is not a weapon. The unguided bomb that the JDAM is attached to is
a weapon. When the JDAM is installed on the unguided bomb, an entirely
new weapon has been created, which must be considered “new” for weapon
review purposes. This conclusion seems uncontroversial. That a new
weapon is not created when the unguided bomb undergoes a de minimis
change, such as being repainted, is equally uncontroversial. Where, then,
does one draw the line?
The ICRC argues that Article 36 extends to cover “an existing weapon
that is modified in a way that alters its function, or a weapon that has already

71. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, ¶ 1466.
72. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK W EAPON REVIEWS.
73. RAYTHEON, STINGER W EAPON SYSTEM, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/stinger/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
74. BOEING, W EAPONS, http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/ (last visited
Aug. 21, 2017).
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passed a legal review but that is subsequently modified.” 75 William Boothby
echoes this perspective, observing that a weapon should be re-reviewed
when “the weapon has been the subject of an upgrade or other amendment
that changes its combat performance.”76 Other commentators conclude that
Article 36 extends to weapons “subsequently modified after an initial review.”77 Further, one commentator finds that “significant changes in anticipated use” would trigger a new review. 78 The Tallinn Manual uses this same
language, concluding that “significant changes” to a weapon would trigger a
new review under Article 36, but that “[m]inor changes that do not affect
[the weapon’s] operational effects . . . would not trigger the requirement for
a subsequent review.”79
The idea that “significant” or “material” changes to a weapon triggers a
legal requirement for a new review finds some support in State practice. The
UK weapon review policy guidance notes that weapons subject to review
can be entirely new systems or systems that originate after “modifications to
existing systems.”80 The document expressly states “any change in a systems’
use or capability” will subject the system “to further review.” 81 Similarly, the
U.S. Air Force regulation governing weapon reviews requires reviews of “all
weapons being developed, bought, built, modified or otherwise being acquired
by the Air Force . . . .”82 Likewise, the U.S. Army requires the originator of
the request for a weapon review to notify the reviewing authority when
changes are made to a weapon system that “would modify the injury or dam-

75. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 70.
76. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 355.
77. Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons? The
Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 I NTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 345, 352 (2002).
78. James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave
Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUMBIA J OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 453, 471 (2006).
79. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE I NTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER W ARFARE r. 48, at ¶ 8 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
80. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK W EAPON REVIEWS.
81. Id.
82. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 51-402, Legal Reviews of
Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, July 27, 2011, ¶ 1, http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSA
EBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-053.pdf (emphasis added).
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age producing mechanisms of the weapon or weapon system or their intended use in armed conflict.”83 Finally, the German weapon review process
applies to “newly developed [or] significantly modified” weapons. 84
The authors have reached the position that changes or modifications to
a weapon would trigger a new review when the changes satisfy a two-part
test: (1) the changes cause the weapon to operate in a manner not contemplated by the first weapon review; and (2) the changes potentially affect the
ability to use the weapon in compliance with applicable legal standards. The
second prong of this formulation would exclude changes that cause different
performance than expected but bear no relation to the legal obligations of
the weapon. For instance, an autonomous air system might learn that it is
more fuel efficient to fly at 10,000 feet, rather than 9,500 feet. This change
is causing the system to perform in a manner unexpected at the time of the
review, but nonetheless should not trigger a new review, assuming the altitude change did not affect its compliance with legal rules. Conversely, this
formulation would include modifications that increase or decrease the ability
of the system to act with, or be employed with, distinction, or modifications
that cause the weapon to have more or different kinetic effect, thus changing
the proportionality calculus.
Having decided upon a threshold, how does one apply it to continuously
learning systems? The obvious solution would be to restrict learning to controlled environments. This might be a short-term solution, but the potential
military advantages of a system that can learn in the operational environment
will likely be too great to ignore. Recognizing the inherent difficulties with
learning systems, the U.S. Defense Science Board recommended that testing
and evaluation of such systems occur across the entire life cycle of the system. 85 Even where a system is trained entirely in a controlled environment,
however, the possibility remains that different individual systems will learn
slightly differently. Consider the Stinger example. The neural network powering each Stinger would have to be trained. The network would self-adjust
to the desired outcome, but each network would adjust differently from sister networks on other missiles even using the same training sets. Thus, if the
83. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 27-53, Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law, Jan. 1, 1979, ¶ 6(a)(3), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/
ar27-53.pdf.
84. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Regulation A-2146/1, June 13, 2106, ¶ 3.
85. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, SUMMER STUDY ON
AUTONOMY 33 (2016) [hereinafter SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY].
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manufacturer produced 100 Stingers, and each was trained in the same manner, it is still conceivable that the individual missiles will have different aptitudes. If the systems learn in situ, these concerns become more acute.
The Forum grappled with this issue at length. It is easy enough to posit
that a system must be re-reviewed when a relevant change is made. However,
when a system learns continuously, and the outcomes of that learning are
not predictable, it is hard, if not impossible, to state at what point it must be
re-reviewed.
Despite this challenge, the problem is not intractable. In order for the
weapon or system to pass its initial review, most agreed that it would be
critical to understand what stimuli the system would be exposed to, and how
this would affect the system’s learning. Otherwise, the system would risk
being too unpredictable for a weapon reviewing lawyer to be satisfied that
its intended use (or range of uses) was lawful. 86 This forward-looking review
of what the machine might learn and in what circumstances could be supplemented by a program of re-reviews, tailored to the system, which might
be periodic (time-based) or substantive (after each operational or exercise
use) as discussed between the system engineers, the user community and the
legal reviewer.
B. Questions Addressed by the Review
The specific laws of armed conflict to be considered during a weapon review
are relatively settled.87 If a weapon review is to comply with Article 36, it is
widely accepted that the following assessments must be considered:
1. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare (or its use, possession, development) prohibited by a specific treaty or customary law provision? 88
2. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare inherently of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in its normal or intended use?89

86. See infra Part IV.B (discussing “authorized power”).
87. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 342–49.
88. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct.
13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370.
89. AP I, supra note 1, art. 35(2).
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3. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare inherently of a nature to be
indiscriminate, in its normal or intended use? 90
4. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare intended, or might be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment?91
Commentators have suggested additional considerations. For example,
William Boothby suggests that a fifth question ought to be asked: Are there
any possible or likely developments in the law that will render the weapon,
means or method of warfare unlawful during its anticipated lifetime?92 Moreover, the ICRC suggests consideration of proportionality and precautions in
attack as well as an evaluation under the Martens Clause. 93
At the Forum, there seemed to be general agreement as to the four criteria articulated above. The fifth consideration suggested by Boothby also
garnered significant support and is reflected in the UK approach. There was
notable debate regarding the ICRC suggestions. Contrary to the ICRC position, some at the Forum took the position that proportionality is always a
question for the operational commander in the circumstances of a particular
attack, not a general question for a weapon review. 94 Similarly, some took
the view that separate review under the Martens Clause is not warranted,
perhaps because, as Dinstein notes, “general revulsion in the face of a particular conduct during hostilities (even if it goes beyond habitual fluctuations
of public opinion) does not create ‘an independent legal criterion regulating
weaponry’ or methods of warfare.”95 This view keeps with the U.S. position
90. Id., art. 51(4)(b)–(c).
91. Id., art. 35(3). See also Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S.
151.
92. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 348.
93. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 70, at 945. For the Martens
Clause, see the Preamble to 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, which states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Parties
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.

Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
94. BOOTHBY, supra note 3.
95. Y ORAM DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 14 (3d ed. 2016) (citing P.A. Robblee, The Legitimacy of Modern Conventional Weaponry, 71 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 95, 125
(1976)).
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on the applicability of the Martens Clause. 96 The United Kingdom, however,
does specifically address the Martens Clause in its weapon reviews.
Many agreed that considerations of targeting law and precautions in attack were questions for the operational commander and his or her legal and
other advisers to consider in the particular circumstances of an operation or
attack. For example, the application of the considerations in Article 57 can
only properly be made on the facts of a specific scenario and cannot be considered in isolation when a weapon is procured. However, the case was made
that for autonomous weapons or weapons with a high degree of autonomy,
the concept of employment for the weapon system may call for issues of
targeting and precautions in attack to be called forward to the weapon review
stage. 97 For example, an anti-aircraft defense (ADA) system may be pre-authorized to engage enemy aircraft within given parameters. As opposed to a
conventional ADA system, elements of the engagement decision, such as the
decision regarding the specific target to engage, are pre-loaded in a weapon.
It was argued by some that with such a system the weapon review should
consider factors such as proportionality and precautions in attack.
This argument was not universally accepted. Some considered that as
long as the system was capable of lawful use, then the decision as to whether
to field it and employ it was always a “choice of means” question under Article 57 and therefore one for the commander, cognizant of the weapon’s
authorized engagement parameters, the effect of its round and other considerations. On this analysis, it was not a question for a weapon review. Arguably, both approaches lead to the same substantive result; namely, that these
important legal issues are properly addressed before systems are fielded.

96. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organization in Geneva, U.S. Delegation Statement on Overarching Issues, CCW
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) (Apr. 16,
2015), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/04/16/ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-on -le
thal-autonomous-weapons-systems-laws/ (“As an initial matter, the Martens Clause is not
a rule of international law that prohibits any particular weapon, much less a weapon that
does not currently exist. Rather, it is recognition that when no specific rule applies, the
customary principles of IHL govern conduct during armed conflict.”).
97. See, e.g., Kimberley Trapp, Precautionary Measures, ‘Feasibility, & LAWS, Presen tation to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Apr.
11–15, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/F8A5FD4EB8
12F8BAC1257F94004245CF/$file/CCW_LAWS+MX+ Presentations_ChallengestoIHL_
Kimberley+Trapp.pdf.
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C. Relevant Considerations
Specific considerations will inform each question addressed in a legal review.
Accordingly, a weapon system’s reliability in performing as intended in its
concept of employment will inform a great many of the substantive legal
considerations. Consider the relatively humble 5.56mm rifle bullet. It will
usually be designed to be propelled, rotating at high velocity, in a straight line
from the infantryman’s rifle to the desired target. In n % of usages, it will
perform as intended. However, in 100-n % of usages, it will malfunction in
some way, perhaps by “tumbling” in the air, causing it to miss its target or
inflict a wound upon the intended target more serious than it would have
been had the round not tumbled. Or, it may fail to reach its target at all.
These issues must all be considered by the weapon reviewing lawyer,
who must ask how reliable any given weapon system has been in testing. 98
What is the effect of any malfunction? Does malfunction affect the system’s
ability to comply with, say, the rule of distinction or the rule prohibiting unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury? If not, then the weapon is simply
less effective rather than less compliant: a problem for the procurement authority and the end operational user, perhaps, but not so much a concern for
the reviewing lawyer. But, where reliability effects legal compliance, the reviewing lawyer must ask to what extent the law permits malfunction. The
representatives at the Forum were clear that no weapon system (or any system) operates at 100% effectiveness. Accordingly, the law cannot require
100%. But, is there an acceptable reliability threshold? And, if so, what is
that threshold? Is it 95%? 50%?
The authors sensed agreement among many at the Forum that the acceptable reliability threshold will depend upon the effect of failure on a system’s ability to comply with any given rule. It is impossible to set a benchmark reliability figure that will apply to all systems subject to review, but the
performance of old systems that the new capability is designed to replace
might be indicative. Still, they may not be indicative if a new system brings
with it a marked change to military effectiveness in comparison to the system
it replaces. In essence, this is a contextual legal judgment, grounded in reasonableness or due diligence. 99 In reaching this judgment, the legal reviewer
98. See generally supra Part III.
99. Of note, in some circumstances, “due diligence” obligations may be more stringent
on States with greater resources to allocate to the problem. International law is otherwise
silent on how States use their resources to meet competing demands. See Trapp, supra note
97, at 5–7.
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will have to assess what level of effort procurement teams have invested in
determining reliability. What trials have been done, and in what circumstances? Were they suitably realistic? How reliable are the conclusions the
procurement team has reached as to the system’s failure rate, and the effects
of failure? Do these considerations provide a sufficiently robust basis on
which to ground legal advice? The answer will depend on the circumstances.
The 5.56mm rifle round has been deliberately chosen to demonstrate
that these apparently difficult questions arise even in the context of relatively
uncontroversial and non-complex weapons or weapon systems. For weapon
systems involving complex technology, including high degrees of autonomy,
automation or machine learning, these questions are especially important and
empirically harder to answer. While a reviewing lawyer need not understand
the technology in intricate detail, he or she will need to have a sufficient grasp
of the technology to understand its capabilities, limitations and reliability.
Many at the Forum felt that sheer complexity alone was not a reason a system
should fail a weapon review. It was equally agreed that a system that performed unpredictably would fail a weapon review if the reviewing lawyer
could not be satisfied that the range of possible outcomes from a system’s
use was lawful. This lack of predictability might be because of unacceptable
system failure, or because the system lacked sufficient built-in controls by
design. An example of the former would be the system that erroneously
identified cats as tanks, whereas an example of the latter would be a system
that was permitted, because of less than stringent engineering standards, to
adopt unlawful behaviors in response to certain stimuli. For example, a system that was allowed to learn that it could evade detection and destruction
by acting perfidiously would be unlawful.
The Forum also considered to what extent enemy action in response to
a system’s employment was a relevant consideration in a weapon review.
This is particularly pertinent in the context of systems dependent on autonomy or artificial intelligence, as critics have suggested that these systems
would be prone to hacking, or that it would be easy to subvert or mislead a
deep learning system to behave unlawfully. 100 Some participants suggested
that enemy action to counter a system should be considered in a review.
While this might clearly be expedient, is it a legal requirement? Participants
expressed a range of views at the Forum, but the view that comes closest to
representing consensus is that only likely or inevitable enemy action must be
100. See, e.g., John Markoff, Report Cites Dangers of Autonomous Weapons, NEW Y ORK
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/report-citesdangers-of-autonomous-weapons.html.
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contemplated, as the high likelihood of these responses means they should
properly be considered as part of the context in which the system will be
used. Second, and analogous to the position reached on malfunction, the
weapon review needs to focus on the effect of enemy action. Does it affect
the system’s ability to comply with the law, or does it merely make the system
less operationally effective?
D. Testing and Evaluation
The newness and complexity of these technologies raise significant questions
concerning how such technologies are tested, and the way in which that testing and evaluation (T&E) informs the legal review. The most detailed consideration of autonomy in the context of weapon testing and weapon reviews
comes in three U.S. Department of Defense documents: two unmanned systems “roadmaps” and a recent report from the U.S. Department of Defense
Science Review Board. Each will be discussed in turn.
In 2011, the United States published a report titled Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036. 101 This report considered the technological
challenges for testing weapons that are posed by the utilization of sophisticated technologies, including weapon systems with high levels of “net-centricity and automated functionality” that are likely to “introduce unexpected
levels of risk.”102 The report concluded, “early-onset T&E and life-cycle
T&E will become increasingly critical” in the face of weapons with everincreasing levels of complication, integration, collaboration and autonomy.103
In technologically advanced systems, complexities typically arise with the
“unintended and unanticipated interactions between elements that are uncovered only during integration, testing, or once in service.” 104 Thus, the report found that:
Unmanned systems raise new issues of artificial intelligence, communications, autonomy, interoperability, propulsion and power, and manned-unmanned (MUM) teaming that will challenge current T&E capabilities.
These problems will get more serious as systems become more interactive
and more automated. Failures often occur at the interfaces between system
101. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP
FY2011–2036 (2011) [hereinafter UNMANNED SYSTEMS I NTEGRATED ROADMAP].
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 10.
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elements, in many cases, between interfaces thought to be separate. The
exponential trends in software and network communications increasingly
mean that many elements of a system can now affect one another.105

The report warned that complex software will require “new approaches
for detecting problems earlier in the design phase where cost mitigation is
most effective.”106 As a practical matter, “[a]s systems get much of their functionality from software and multisystem interactions, complexity is no longer
separate and distinct. Complexity is about the whole ecosystem, and systems
engineering has to become more holistic.”107 The report authors suggest the
solution to this problem is model-based systems engineering that would allow test data to be used throughout the development, acquisitions, and use
of a weapon system. 108
The U.S. Department of Defense published a second roadmap in 2013
titled Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–2038.109 This second document discusses testing in much greater detail and provides for the division
of responsibility for testing autonomous weapons within the Department of
Defense, and articulates standards of testing. Critically, the new roadmap
cautions “automation is only as good as the software writer and developer
because the control algorithms are created and tested by teams of humans.”110 The report further emphasizes the importance of continuous updates to the system111 and “well-written and tested software”112 to ensure
correct operations.
Another important policy document identifying challenges with testing
autonomous weapons is the U.S. Defense Science Board’s 2016 Summer Study
on Autonomy. The Defense Science Board finds that trust in autonomous systems is “core to the DoD’s success in broader adoption of autonomy.” 113
Here, trust refers to the satisfaction that an autonomous system will operate
in an expected or predictable manner. Establishing trust, the report concludes “is essential, not only for operators and commanders, but also for

105. Id. at 11.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 67.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 72.
113. SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY, supra note 85, at 1.
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designers, testers, policymakers, lawmakers, and the American public.” 114
Verification, validation, testing and evaluation procedures establish trust. 115
Autonomous technologies present special problems for testing systems.
The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–2038 finds that “[e]xisting
ranges and test facilities have been adequate to test systems with very limited
autonomous capabilities.”116 This, of course, suggests that existing ranges
and test facilities are inadequate for weapons with advanced autonomous
features. This outcome is unsurprising. As the Review Board queries, “How
can autonomous systems benefit from T&E when every time they are used
they change themselves . . . and how can we verify that systems are learning
the right things?”117 Adaptive systems also have the propensity to exhibit
emergent behaviors, that is, they may take unexpected actions. Such adaptability may be militarily beneficial, but predicting such behavior is nearly impossible, and the implications of this uncertainty from a weapon review perspective have already been addressed. As the report readily admits, “it would
be difficult to know a priori if the collective’s adaptive responses would be
beneficial or detrimental to a military mission”118 and “research is required
to understand the best ways to test for emergent behavior characteristics.”119
The Summer Study on Autonomy concludes that current conventional testing capabilities are insufficient to ensure the system “will respond appropriately to all of the possible inputs.”120 To resolve this issue, the study recommends using “a combination of modeling and simulation to explore thousands of test cases, statistically measuring system performance against the
desired standard, then doing real world testing of the system to ensure that
the modeled and real world behavior match for corner cases that span the
range of system performance.”121 Much as neural networks are only as good
as their training, autonomous systems will only be as good as their modeling
and simulation programs.
The Review Board provides several recommendations to address the
complexities wrought by autonomous weapons. These recommendations included testing throughout the life cycle of an autonomous weapon system,
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21.
116. UNMANNED SYSTEMS I NTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 101, at 138.
117. SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY, supra note 85, at 13.
118. Id. at 84.
119. Id. at 32. Within this article, see supra 338–39 for weapon review implications.
120. SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY, supra note 85, at 29.
121. Id.
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as noted above, 122 but also the establishment of new testing paradigms for
learning systems, 123 the use of software that can be upgraded without triggering the need for a full system regression testing124 and the use of “red
teams” to attempt to find flaws in the software. 125
The next Part assesses whether and how the issues raised in the three
U.S. documents described above are reflected in any emerging or existing
norms regarding the review, control and use of possible future weapons.
IV.

POTENTIAL NORMS

At the conclusion of the Forum, the authors sensed that most participants
saw no need for a preemptive ban, though all agreed that LAWS, however
defined, must comply with existing law. The issue of “control” came up regularly, particularly in the context of compliance with numerous substantive
legal rules. For example, how can a legal reviewer be sure a system will comply with the law of armed conflict rule of discrimination if he or she cannot
be sure how the system is controlled? Once again, this is not as novel an
issue as many pretend: widespread concern over belligerents’ ability to control naval mines led to Hague Convention VIII in 1907. 126 Indeed, under the
law of armed conflict, the requirement for belligerent control over weapon
systems is abundantly clear, whether the weapon system is autonomous or
not.
Nonetheless, “control” featured heavily in the discussion of LAWS at
CCW and elsewhere. The Forum discussed two concepts for describing how
“control” over autonomous technologies might be reflected in the law. One
is the concept of “meaningful human control,” the other was “authorized
power.” Whether these concepts would be new, stand-alone norms or simply
a way for new and emerging technologies to comply with existing norms is
debatable, though it may not matter, so long as the existing legal requirement
that weapons be controlled is not denuded by over-reliance on technology.
Both concepts are examined in more detail below.

122. Id. at 21.
123. Id. at 32.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id. at 27.
126. See Steven Haines, 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic
Submarine Contact Mines, 90 I NTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 412, 417–20 (2014).
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A. Meaningful Human Control
The phrase “meaningful human control” (MHC) is frequently used in the
debate over LAWS. The phrase is used by some commentators to define
LAWS (LAWS are weapons without MHC, that should, therefore, be
banned); 127 others employ it as a way of reflecting social, ethical and legal
concerns about how such technologies should be employed (LAWS may be
employed so long as they operate under MHC). 128 Some States employ similar phrases in their public pronouncements on LAWS. The United States
policy requires commanders and operators to “exercise appropriate levels of
human judgment over the use of force,” 129 while the United Kingdom has
declared that all weapons will operate under human control. 130 The popularity of the term has prompted the UN Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR) to observe that “for a variety of stakeholders the idea of Meaningful Human Control is intuitively appealing, even if the concept is not precisely defined.”131
The ICRC has offered its support to the “human control” concept.
Nonetheless, the ICRC correctly observes that “it remains unclear whether
human control at the stages of the development and the deployment of an
autonomous weapon system is sufficient to overcome minimal or no human
control at the stage of the weapon system’s operation.”132 In their original
127. Killer Robots and the Concept of Meaningful Human Control: Memorandum to Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Delegates, HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH (Apr. 11, 2016, 12:01
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/11/killer-robots-and-concept-meaningful-human-control.
128. See, e.g., CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, AUTONOMOUS W EAPONS
AND HUMAN CONTROL (2016), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196780/CNAS_Autonomous_Weapons_poster_FINAL%20(1).pdf.
129. Directive 3000.09, supra note 19, at 2.
130. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Statement to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, General Exchange,
supra note 23.
131. UNITED NATIONS I NSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (UNIDIR), THE
W EAPONIZATION OF I NCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: CONSIDERING
HOW MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL MIGHT MOVE THE DISCUSSION FORWARD 2
(2014), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-meaningful-hum
an-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward-en-615.pdf.
132. Statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS) 11–15 April 2016, Geneva (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.unog.ch
/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/9324B81015529E3DC1257F930057AF12/$file/201
6_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Statements_ICRC.pdf.
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formulation of MHC, Article 36—the British NGO that coined the term—
argued that each individual attack should be initiated only through a positive
action by a human operator based on “adequate contextual information on
the target area of an attack.”133 Further, Article 36 argued that “adequate
contextual information” should include why the target was selected for attack, mission objectives and information regarding the effects of the weapon
system. 134 Article 36 has since refined its position, requiring that “those who
plan or decide on an attack have sufficient information and control over a
weapon to be able to predict how the weapon will operate and what effects
it will produce in the context of an individual attack, and thus, to make the
required legal judgements.”135 This formulation of MHC appears to recognize that sufficient control can be “baked in” to a weapon system during
technological development, combined with the provision of satisfactory human safeguards during an operation to override the technology if there is a
problem or an unforeseen circumstance.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) implies that it believes the concept requires human involvement right up to the decision to engage each individual
target. Indeed, HRW’s 2014 Memorandum for delegates at the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons states: “Meaningful human control guarantees that human perception and judgment inform the decision about
whether to use lethal force in a specific instance.”136 Other entities have put
forth similar, though subtly different constructions of the term MHC. 137
133. ARTICLE 36, KILLER ROBOTS: UK GOVERNMENT POLICY ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS W EAPONS 4 (2013), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Policy_Paper1.pdf.
134. Id.
135. ARTICLE 36, KEY AREAS FOR DEBATE ON AUTONOMOUS W EAPONS SYSTEMS:
MEMORANDUM FOR DELEGATES AT THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
W EAPONS (CCW) MEETING OF E XPERTS ON LETHAL AUTONOMOUS W EAPONS SYSTEMS
(LAWS) 2 (2014), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW May-2014.pdf.
136. Id.
137. The International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) also advocates
for a preemptive ban on autonomous weapons. See, e.g., Frank Sauer, ICRAC Statement on
Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert Meeting , ICRAC: I NTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (May 14, 2014) http://icrac.net/2014/05/icrac-statement-o n technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-exp ert-meeting/.
ICRAC holds that the minimum necessary conditions for meaningful human control are
First, a human commander (or operator) must have full contextual and situational awareness of the target area and be able to perceive and react to any change or unanticipated
situations that may have arisen since planning the attack.

417

International Law Studies

2017

HRW’s approach to MHC perhaps reflects the most exacting expression
of this concept. In contrast, some scholars seem to accept that technology,
such as facial and voice recognition, might objectively be better than humans
at identifying targets and thereby actually increase the commander’s control
over who or what is engaged, and in what circumstances. 138 This is especially
the case where the engagement related task devolved to a machine has a clear
“right” answer, such as object identification. Where the engagement-related
task depends on context or value-based decisions, technology might currently be less effective than a human. 139
Rapid technological development, however, may mean that machines
can make these value decisions in the future. For example, consider that automated dictation technology is now near equal to humans in effectively
transcribing the human voice, contrary to the predictions of many researchers based on dubious experiences of the technology when it first emerged. 140
Similarly, in a recent experiment, an AI system beat a group of professional
poker players. 141 This development is significant because poker, unlike chess,
is a game built on imperfect information. Further, only a year previously,
human players soundly defeated an earlier version of the same program,
demonstrating the speed at which technology is improving. 142 In another example, several companies have introduced neural network technologies that
can diagnose diabetic eye disease with equal or greater precision than doctors

Second, there must be active cognitive participation in the attack and sufficient time for
deliberation on the nature of the target, its significance in terms of the necessity and appropriateness of attack, and likely incidental and possible accidental effects of the attack.
Third, there must be a means for the rapid suspension or abortion of the attack.
Id.

138. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Risner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law
of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 I NTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386
(2014).
139. See, e.g., CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, supra note 128, at 3, 6.
140. Now We’re Talking: How Voice Technology Is Transforming Computing, E CONOMIST, Jan.
7, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21713836-casting-magic-spell-it-letspeople-control-world-through-words-alone-how-voice.
141. Jeremy Hsu, AI Decisively Defeats Human Poker Players, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 31,
2017, 3:12 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligen ce/ ailearns-from-mistakes-to-defeat-human-poker-players.
142. Will Knight, Why Poker Is a Big Deal for Artificial Intelligence, MIT TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW, Jan. 23, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603385/why-poker-is-a-b ig
-deal-for-artificial-intelligen ce/.
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and can do so in less than one second versus one to five minutes for humans. 143 Other researchers have demonstrated neural network enabled programs that can diagnose cancerous tumors “with far greater frequency than
human epidemiologists.”144
As society becomes more comfortable with the technology, it may become more socially acceptable to have decreasing levels of direct human involvement over an attack. 145 Consider what would happen if technology ever
allowed a greater degree of accuracy (through facial mapping or whatever
applicable technique), and therefore control over an attack, than an errorprone human? Such technology could provide a military commander with
virtual certainty that the right target, and only the right target, would be engaged. Social views of the technology would surely be more favorable if that
were ever the case. Further, as a matter of law, when making a choice of
means decision under Article 57, the commander could be legally obliged to
use the more discriminatory, more accurate AI-based solution.
Thus, despite MHC’s initial appeal, it may not turn out to be the normative solution to the issues raised by LAWS. At its extreme, it is likely to be
unrealistically restrictive, while at its lowest point, it is little more than a reformulation of existing law, which already requires control over weapon systems. Given the breadth of interpretations of MHC, perhaps another, more
precise, approach is called for.
B. Authorized Power
Professor Tony Gillespie has proposed another model for control based on
the concept of “authorized power.” This model shows that rules, including
those from Additional Protocol I and those specifically reviewed under Ar-

143. James Farrell, How Stanford Researchers Are Using Deep Learning AI to Fight Blindness,
SILICONANGLE (Jan. 15, 2017, 10:30 PM), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2017/01/15/

qa-researchers-stanford-university-explain-d eep-learning-technology-fighting-blindnessrevolutionizing-healthcare/.
144. Graham Templeton, AI Beats Doctors at Visual Diagnosis, Observes Many Times More
Lung Cancer Signals, E XTREME TECH (Aug. 18, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/233746-ai-b eats-do ctors-at-visual-diagnosis-observes-many-timesmore-lung-cancer-signals.
145. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can (American University
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2013–11, 2013), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250126.
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ticle 36, can be embedded in the system by the use of suitably derived procurement requirements. This approach ensures, among other properties, that
an autonomous system will always be properly subjected to military (and
therefore human) command and control. 146 Gillespie’s model shows how engineering standards can be set during the procurement phase of a weapon or
weapon system that will enable it both to pass an Article 36 review, and to
inform the setting of rules of engagement for the system’s use by commanders or operators. For this reason, his proposal is both more practical and
substantive (although inevitably more technical) than the various MHC models so far proposed. Still, it is not at all inconsistent with the objectives that
MHC is intended to meet. Indeed, it should perhaps be seen as a practical
means of ensuring the level of control that the law already requires in the
context of complex systems.
Gillespie describes complex systems as a hierarchy of decision-making
nodes, with each node responsible to the one above it. This command and
control structure is also found in a 2002 National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) report. 147 The NIST report provides a reference model
architecture that “will evolve as technology and standards advance,” which
“is naturally adaptable to the DoD/Army standards in a combined domain
of vehicle systems, combat support, and software engineering.” 148 It must be
emphasized that a node in a system may be human or machine with its structure based on the traditional “OODA” process: Observe, Orient, Decide,
Act. Each node has a defined, predictive capability. Nodes may have a mix
of some or all of four possible functional elements, outlined below, which
will depend upon the node’s role and position in the hierarchy.
1. Sensory processing. Creates a “world view” and classifies objects.
2. World modeling. Creates and maintains a model of the immediate surroundings; compares this model with information from sensors,
predicts future world state, and predicts the consequences of possible system actions on the predicted world state.
146. Tony Gillespie, Visiting Professor, University College London Department of
Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Systems Engineering as a Solution to Legal Problems
for Highly-Automated Military Systems, Presentation at the Royal Aeronautical Society
Conference: Autonomy Are We There Yet? (June 17, 2016).
147. J AMES S. ALBUS ET AL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL I NSTITUTE
OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 4D/RCS VERSION 2.0: A REFERENCE MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEMS (2002), https://www.nist.gov/publications
/4drcs-version-20-referen ce-model-architecture-unmanned-vehicle-systems.
148. Id. at 160.
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3. Value judgment. Weights the consequences of possible actions according to given criteria (including legal criteria). Identifies a range
of actions, based upon weighted consequences.
4. Behavior generator. Compares the actions identified, then either acts if
the plan or range of plans is within the node’s authorized power, or
refers to a superior when the plans are outside the node’s authorized power.
The authorized power of a node is defined as the range of actions the
node is allowed to implement without referring to a superior node. An autonomous system comprises nodes that are responsible for each function.
Authorized power for each node can and should be pre-determined between
the procurement authority, the end user and the weapon-reviewing lawyer.
Given this collaborative approach early in the procurement process, what
any given node is authorized to do could take account of not only legal concerns, but also social or ethical values, military judgment and any policy or
political concerns.
Finally, Gillespie makes the point that, once set, the authorized power
can form the basis of testing and evaluation to ensure the node’s performance matches expectation. 149 He goes on to say that setting authorized
power for nodes in this way “gives the possibility of separating the responsibilities for post-delivery failures between the supplier and user,” perhaps
answering concerns that increased autonomy on the battlefield risks undermining command or State responsibility for wrongful acts. 150
V.

CONCLUSION

The Forum presented an opportunity to consider how existing law on
weapon reviews squares up to examples of likely future technology. In the
authors’ opinion, it is clear that weapon reviews not only must be applied to
any future autonomous weapons, but that the process of doing so is an effective means of keeping unlawful systems from the battlefield without the
need for a preemptive ban. The discussion at the Forum showed that many
of the criticisms levied at autonomous systems can be rectified if legal reviews are properly conducted during the procurement phase. Where they
cannot be rectified, the system would fail its review and its use would not be
149. Gillespie, supra note 146.
150. Id.
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lawful. The Forum also considered how this might be effected in practice.
One way is applying the concept of “authorized power” to ensure that autonomous capabilities are properly understood and that they are subjected
to the proper level of control already required by law and by military command and control constructs. That being the case, it is all the more regrettable that many States still neglect their obligations under Article 36.
The Forum did not purport to address every issue raised in the LAWS
debate at CCW or elsewhere. For example, the Forum focused primarily on
the law, not social issues or moral concerns. Furthermore, it focused on one
narrow aspect of the regulatory regime: Article 36. Of course, all of IHL
applies to the use of autonomy in weapon systems.
Still, the Forum did address key issues. For example, critics of autonomy
argue that the lack of human characteristics such as compassion and judgment renders machines incapable of complying with the law of armed conflict. But, this position does not take account of the fact that technology is
set to outperform humans in ways and to degrees that are not presently conceivable. Indeed, this article has shown that technology might actually increase
the commander’s control of an engagement, because of better situational
awareness and more certain outcomes. This development hardly reflects
commanders ceding control over weapon systems or the conduct of operations; rather, the nature of control will change from the physical toward the
remote or pre-determined, expressed through sophisticated algorithms discussed and set during a system’s procurement, testing and evaluation.
To rule out the use of future technology before its benefits are fully understood might seem reckless, at least in those circumstances. On the other
hand, it is abundantly clear that warfare must remain closely controlled and
directed by human commanders. The Second International Weapon Review
Forum demonstrated how existing law, properly applied to emerging technologies, contributes to meeting that requirement.
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